University of South Carolina

Scholar Commons
Theses and Dissertations
Summer 2019

Essays on Asymmetric Contests and Urbanization in India
Pulkit K. Nigam

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Nigam, P. K.(2019). Essays on Asymmetric Contests and Urbanization in India. (Doctoral dissertation).
Retrieved from https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/5494

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

ESSAYS ON ASYMMETRIC CONTESTS AND URBANIZATION IN INDIA
by
Pulkit K. Nigam
Bachelor of Engineering
Manipal Institute of Technology, 2006
Master of Arts
Georgia State University, 2010

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Economics
Darla Moore School of Business
University of South Carolina
2019
Accepted by:
Alexander Matros, Major Professor
Douglas Woodward, Committee Member
Orgul Ozturk, Committee Member
Kealy Carter, Committee Member
Cheryl L. Addy, Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School

© Copyright by Pulkit K. Nigam, 2019
All Rights Reserved.

ii

ABSTRACT
I study asymmetric all-pay auction contests where the prize has the same value for
all players, but players might have different cost functions. I allow for the cost functions to
be discontinuous as long as they are right-continuous. In that setting, I determine sufficient
conditions for existence and uniqueness of the conventional mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Employing this framework, I discuss the implementation of a soft cap on bids and the effect
that has on the conventional mixed-strategy equilibrium and players’ bidding behavior,
especially with respect to a situation where there is no cap on bids. I also determine the
total cost and expected aggregate bids which would influence, and also have an effect on
the organizing of such contests.
Drawing from the framework mentioned above, I analyze the implementation of a
rigid cap on bids. Rigid cap being one which simply cannot be breached. I determine the
players’ bidding behavior in the conventional mixed-strategy equilibrium and compute the
total cost and expected aggregate bids in this situation.
In the fourth chapter, I explore linguistic explanations for the extremely low labor
mobility, but paradoxically high urban wage premium in India. I show how linguistic
diversity in India hinders internal migration across state borders. I also find evidence, albeit
a weak one, to show that an individual who can speak English is more likely to migrate to
an urban center. I find much stronger evidence that links educational attainment with
migrating to urban centers.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Contests are events where two or more interested parties or players, compete by
expending effort or resources in order to secure something of value to all players. Contest
can be symmetric, or asymmetric, for a variety of reasons. There could be player specific
attributes that lead one player to have a certain advantage and thereby making the contest
uneven, and asymmetric. In such contests, a cap on bids is placed so as to limit the spending
of the players, so that no player can gain any advantage over the other. There are many
examples of such situations where a cap on spending is implemented with the view of
making the contest fairer. For example, political campaign financing laws in many
countries ensure that the money that any candidate receives to fight an election campaign,
and how much she spends during the campaign is monitored very tightly so that there is no
expenditure that is unaccounted for.
Che and Gale (1998), were perhaps the first to study caps being put in place in a
game theoretic setting of asymmetric contests. Che and Gale (1998) however, considered
a cap which could not be breached by anyone. They showed that the stronger of the two
players in the contest would see her chances of winning this contest to reduce slightly, and
increasing the total cost. Kaplan and Wettstein (2006) pointed out that in most practical
situations, a cap on bids is not one that cannot be breached. An example could be one of
breaching the speed limit while driving. In such cases in the real world, breaching a cap
attracts a fine, monetary or otherwise. Kaplan and Wettstein (2006) show that a contest
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with no cap on bids stochastically dominates one with cap on bids. We study the three
possible cases here, one with a ‘soft’ cap on bids, which has an associated fine for breaching
the cap, the second case with no cap on bids, and finally one with rigid cap on bids which
cannot be breached. Additionally, we also model the contest in a manner distinct from
earlier approaches in the literature, in that, we allow for players to face discontinuous cost
functions, which competing for a single prize of homogenous valuation. With
discontinuous cost functions, we attempt to capture the jump in cost that a fine, or a
monetary penalty could potentially create if a player were to breach the cap. Alternatively,
a player might factor the jump in cost due to the fine, and bid accordingly.
The third chapter, unlike the first two, which deal with game theoretic models, is
about internal migration and urbanization in India. As India grows economically and also
in terms of its population soon to become the world’s largest, internal migration and
urbanization in India will be of greater interest. I have tried to bring to fore the aspect of
linguistic diversity in India, which is unlike any other country, and how that impact internal
migrations and urbanization. This draws on the cross-country done by Chauvin et. al.
(2017) who find it difficult to explain the low (labor) mobility in India and the high urban
wage premiums there. I attempt to find answers to the questions raised by Chauvin et. al.
(2017) in the linguistic diversity that exists in India. Despite issues pertaining to the
availability of satisfactory data, I am able to show and highlight the impact that linguistic
diversity in India has on internal migration in India.
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CHAPTER 2
ASYMMETRIC CONTESTS WITH A SOFT CAP ON BIDS
1. Introduction
A cap on spending has conventionally been argued for as a way of providing a level
playing field to contestants of varying capabilities. When the contest is an election
campaign putting a cap on how much a political party, or a candidate can spend on the
campaign is meant to ensure that no one party or candidate accumulates advantage based
simply on their capacity to outspend their opponent(s). Similarly, a cap on salary paid to
players by sports teams is meant to ensure that the best talent is not concentrated in just a
handful of teams making them extraordinarily dominant in a sports league. Usually these
caps are enforced through fines or penalties levied upon those who spend in excess of the
cap. For the 2015 season, the Major League Baseball (MLB) had a spending cap in form
of a Competitive Balance Tax, also known as a Luxury Tax, where a team spending more
than $189 million in player payroll would have to pay a tax for every dollar they were
above the cap1. This however did not prevent Los Angeles Dodgers from spending in
excess of $298 million, significantly above the $189 million cap. LA Dodgers was not
alone in this, they were joined by New York Yankees, Boston Red Sox, and San Francisco
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Breaking Down Over $400 Million In MLB Luxury Tax Penalties Since 2003. Maury Brown, Forbes, Dec
3, 2015
https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2015/12/03/breaking-down-over-400-million-in-mlb-luxurytax-penalties-since-2003/#33bb1623541a
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Giants. Owing to the structure of this Luxury Tax, the amount that these teams had to pay
as a consequence of breaching the cap ranges from $1.3 million for SF Giants to almost
$44 million for LA Dodgers. In the field of politics, ‘Vote Leave’, the official campaign
group advocating British exit from the European Union in the 2016 referendum on that
issue, was fined £61,000 by the (UK) Electoral Commission for breaching the £7 million
spending limit, and spending approximately an extra £500,0002. More recently, soccer’s
European governing body, UEFA, opened investigation into accusations of violation of
Financial Fair Play rules by the English team Manchester City and its owner 3. These are
just some of the instances that demonstrate that contestants are willing to exceed a cap on
spending and include the imminent penalty as part of the costs in pursuit of maximizing
their payoffs4.
Given the examples discussed above, it is imperative to point out that there is a
distinction between the cost that players incur in a contest, and the bids they make. The
organizer may want players to incur a high cost in preparing for a contest as a signal of
their intent. For example, in a tendering process for a contract, the organizing party
(government agency or private firm) may want prospective contractors to come up
elaborate proposals for implementation of the project under consideration. This might
increase the cost for the prospective contractors, the organizing party could use the signal

2

Vote Leave fined and referred to police. Jim Pickard and Camilla Hodgson, Financial Times, July 17, 2018
https://www.ft.com/content/a8b848ce-8987-11e8-b18d-0181731a0340
3
Manchester City accuse Uefa of leaks amid Champions League ban threat. David Conn, The Guardian, May
14, 2019
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2019/may/14/manchester-city-uefa-champions-league-ban-protestinnocence
4
In the case of MLB 2015 season described above, the LA Dodgers spent an extra $109 million above the
cap, which came at a cost of almost $44 million, this shows that costs beyond the threshold of a cap, ‘jumps’
owing to the penalty imposed.
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to reject those candidates who may come across as tacky. Alternately, in a promotion
contest to be a top executive, a firm might prefer to lower costs for all players and simply
expect that the prospective candidates would put in maximum effort as their bid. This
shows that the distinction between the cost to players (aggregate cost) and bids by players
(aggregate bids) may matter to both the players and the organizer.
2. Literature
Che and Gale (1998) was amongst the first papers to formally analyze model a
contest with caps. They model a contest as a complete information two-player all-pay
auction where players have different valuations for the same prize and their bid is the cost
they incur in participating in the contest. They consider a rigid cap on bids which simply
cannot be breached. As their model considers the cost to be the bid, there is no distinction
between aggregate cost, and aggregate bids. They find that a small rigid cap on bids leads
to an increases in aggregate cost in the contest, which is the same as an increase in
aggregate bids as per their model. Kaplan and Wettstein (2006) in response point out that
more often than not, there is a fine or a penalty associated with the breaching of a cap on
bids, and so a soft, and not a rigid cap is more commonplace. They model the costs incurred
by players as strictly increasing continuous functions of the bid amount. They argue that
bidding without cap stochastically dominates bidding with a (soft) cap, and that the
imposition of a soft cap does not affect aggregate costs but always reduces expected bids.
They further argue that monetary fines could be welfare enhancing, while non-monetary
fines like banning a team may be detrimental. In their response, Che and Gale (2006)
discuss and argue that the aggregate costs increase due cost-equalizing shifts when players
face different cost functions. They further show that monetary fines have no effect on
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expected aggregate cost, while a nonmonetary penalty generates strictly higher expected
aggregate cost. In a more recent paper, Olszewski and Siegel (2019) look at the effect of
both, rigid and soft caps on the aggregate costs incurred by, and aggregate bids made by
contestants in large all-pay auction contests; where a large number of heterogeneous
contestants compete for a large number of prizes. They conclude that as far as aggregate
costs are concerned, flexible caps have next to no effect, but rigid caps always lower
aggregate costs. Rigid caps also decrease aggregate bids when cost functions are linear or
concave, but could increase aggregate bids for convex cost functions in some conditions.
Flexible caps on the other hand, always decrease aggregate bids. Their approach is different
from the studies mentioned earlier, in that, they consider a situation with 𝑛 number of
players and 𝑛 number of prizes, while earlier studies are 2-player games with a single prize
and 2-valuations of that prize. Furthermore, Olszewski and Siegel (2019) use an assortative
allocation to award 𝑛 prizes to 𝑛 players based on their bid. The authors do have a similarity
with earlier works as each player faces strictly increasing and continuous cost functions
under all circumstances. These studies show there to be some ambiguity around the effects
of a cap on bids5, 6. In this study we focus on soft cap on bids, where a monetary penalty is
implemented for breaching a cap on bids. Our study sits well with the discussion initiated
by Che and Gale (1998) and carried forward by Kaplan and Wettstein (2006), and Che and
Gale (2006). Our findings support Kaplan and Wettstein (2006) when they say that bidding
without a cap strictly dominates bidding with a soft cap on bids. We further are in
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Pastine and Pastine (2013) extended Kaplan and Wettstein (2006) and Che and Gale (2006) by incorporating
politician preferences into their framework.
6
Other studies look at the Caps in Contests from different angles. Gavious, Moldovanu, and Sela (2002)
study private-information contests with caps. Szech (2015) revisits Che and Gale (1998) and analyzes
different tie-breaking rules.
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agreement with Kaplan and Wettstein (2006), and Olszewski and Siegel (2019), in so far
as the decrease in aggregate bids is concerned when a soft cap in implemented. However,
we show that aggregate costs decrease when a soft cap with a monetary fine is
implemented, while both, Kaplan and Wettstein (2006), and Olszewski and Siegel (2019),
argue that a soft cap has no effect on aggregate costs. These results are highlighted in Table
1.1.
We model an asymmetric contest as an all-pay auction where the players have the
same valuation of the prize, but different right-continuous cost functions. In doing so, we
seek to capture the ‘jump’, or the discontinuity in the costs owing to a non-rigid fine or a
soft cap being implemented.
It is standard in the literature to model asymmetric contests as all-pay auctions
where players have different valuation of a single prize and the same linear cost functions,
and to obtain conventional mixed-strategy equilibria, where the most efficient player
obtains a positive expected payoff, and the other players get expected zero payoffs. See,
for example, Hillman and Riley (1989), Baye, Kovenock, and De Vries (1993, 1996).7 A
typical assumption in this literature is that cost functions are twice continuously
differentiable.
We provide sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the conventional mixed-strategy
equilibrium in our setting. This equilibrium is qualitatively different from equilibria in
previous studies. Moreover, we construct the conventional mixed-strategy equilibrium
even if different players have caps at different points and the number of such caps is finite.

7

Siegel (2009, 2010, 2014) considers general contests with continuous cost functions.
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First, we analyze two-player asymmetric contests. We show that there exists the
conventional mixed-strategy equilibrium. However, there might be pure-strategy equilibria
in our model, if the assumption about the right-continuity of the cost functions is violated,
Example 2 illustrates that situation.
3. Asymmetric Two-Player Contest with a Soft Cap
Suppose that two players contest a single prize 𝑉 > 0. The prize value is same for
both players, but the players’ cost functions, indicating their ability, can be different. Thus
we have an asymmetric contest.
We define a ‘soft’ cap on bids as the maximum bid permissible with a penalty
imposed on any player who bids in excess of the soft cap. Essentially, a soft cap on bids is
one where a player can bid in excess of the cap, but at an additional cost incurred in terms
of a monetary penalty or fine. Each player 𝑖 can bid a positive amount 𝑥𝑖 < 𝑠, where 𝑠 > 0
is the soft cap on bids. For a bid 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 𝑠, player 𝑖 will be penalized and will have to pay a
fixed monetary fine 𝑚 ≥ 0. The imposition of the monetary fine will have the effect of
creating a ‘jump’ in the cost faced by any player. Essentially, the cost function faced by
player 𝑖 will increase continuously as long as 𝑥𝑖 < 𝑠. For 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 𝑠 however, the cost function
would be displaced vertically upwards, or jump up by 𝑚 ≥ 0. We model this asymmetric
contest with a soft cap on bids below.
We assume that players have right-continuous cost functions with at most one
discontinuity which satisfy the following conditions8
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We will discuss left-continuous cost functions below.
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if 𝑥 < 𝑠,

𝐿𝑖 (𝑥),

(1)

𝐶𝑖 (𝑥) = {
if 𝑥 ≥ 𝑠,

𝐿𝑖 (𝑥) + 𝑚,
where,

(2)

𝑚≥0
𝐿1 (0) = 𝐿2 (0) = 0
𝐿𝑖 (𝑥) is strictly increasing functions for 𝑖 = 1, 2,

(3)
(4)

We assume that there exists 0 < 𝑡𝑖 < ∞ such that
𝐶𝑖 (𝑡𝑖 ) = 𝑉 for 𝑖 = 1, 2,

(5)

𝑡2 ≤ 𝑡1 .

(6)

and

based on which, we call Player 1 more efficient player.
Each player 𝑖 exerts effort 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0 in order to win the prize in the all-pay auction
and obtains the following payoff

𝑢𝑖 (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 ) =

−𝐶𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 ) ,

if 𝑥𝑖 < 𝑥−𝑖 ,

𝑉
− 𝐶𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 ) ,
2

if 𝑥1 = 𝑥2 ,

{ 𝑉 − 𝐶𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 ) ,

if 𝑥𝑖 > 𝑥−𝑖 .

We can describe a mixed-strategy equilibrium in our setting now.
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(7)

Theorem 1. If conditions (1) – (6) hold, and 𝑑 < 𝑡2 , then there exists a conventional mixedstrategy NE in the asymmetric two-player contest, where Player 1 randomizes according
to the following cumulative distribution function

𝐹1 (𝑥) =

1
𝐶 (𝑥),
𝑉 2

(8)

on the interval [0, 𝑡2 ] placing an atom at 𝑥 = 𝑠, if 𝑠 < 𝑡2 ; and player 2 randomizes
according to the following cumulative distribution function, and Player 2 randomizes
according to the following cumulative distribution function

𝐹2 (𝑥) =

𝑉 − 𝐶1 (𝑡2 ) 1
+ 𝐶1 (𝑥),
𝑉
𝑉

(9)

on the interval [0, 𝑡2 ] placing an atom at zero and at 𝑥 = 𝑠 if 𝑠 < 𝑡2 .
Note that if 𝑚 = 0, or there is no penalty gap, then we get a conventional mixedstrategy NE, similar to the mixed-strategy equilibrium in Hillman and Riley (1989), and in
Baye, Kovenock, and De Vries (1996).

Corollary 1. If 𝑚 = 0 and conditions (3) – (6) hold, then there exists a conventional mixedstrategy NE in the asymmetric two-player contest, where player 1 randomizes according
to the following cumulative distribution function
Player 1 randomizes according to the following cumulative distribution function
𝐹1 (𝑥) =

1
𝐶 (𝑥)
𝑉 2

on the interval [0, 𝑡2 ], and Player 2 randomizes according to the following cumulative
distribution function
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𝐹2 (𝑥) =

𝑉 − 𝐶1 (𝑡2 ) 1
+ 𝐶1 (𝑥)
𝑉
𝑉

on the interval [0, 𝑡2 ], placing an atom of size at zero.
The following corollary is a well-known result in the contest literature where cost
functions are linear.
Corollary 2. If 𝑚 = 0, and
𝐶1 (𝑥) = 𝐶2 (𝑥) = 𝑥,
then there exists a unique (conventional) mixed-strategy NE in the symmetric two-player
contest, where both players randomize according to the following cumulative distribution
function
𝐹1 (𝑥) = 𝐹2 (𝑥) =

𝑥
𝑉

on the interval [0, 𝑡2 ].
If 𝑚 > 0 and 𝑠 < 𝑡2 , then mass points appear at 𝑥 = 0 for player 2 and at the point
of discontinuity, 𝑥 = 𝑠, for both players in the conventional mixed-strategy NE. Note that
player 1 (2) cannot take advantage of the mass point at 𝑥 = 𝑠 in the cdf of player 2 (1)
because her own cost is discontinuous exactly at that point. The following example
illustrates Theorem 1.
Example 1. Suppose that 𝑉 = 2, 𝑠 = 1, 𝑚 = 0.5, the cost functions are
√𝑥,

if 𝑥 < 1,

𝐶1 (𝑥) = {
√𝑥 + 0.5, if 𝑥 ≥ 1,
and
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if 𝑥 < 1,

𝑥,
𝐶2 (𝑥) = {

𝑥 + 0.5, if 𝑥 ≥ 1.
Then, 𝑡2 = 1.5 < 2.25 = 𝑡1 and conditions (1) – (6) hold. In the conventional mixedstrategy NE, player 1 randomizes according to the following cumulative distribution
function:

𝐹1 (𝑥) =

1
𝑥,
2

if 𝑥 ∈ [0, 1),

1
1
𝑥
+
,
{2
4

if 𝑥 ∈ [1, 1.5],

1

on the interval [0, 1.5] placing an atom of size 4 at one. Player 2 randomizes according to
the following cumulative distribution function

𝐹2 (𝑥) =

1.5 − √1.5 1
+ √𝑥,
2
2
2 − √1.5 1
+ √𝑥,
{
2
2

if 𝑥 ∈ [0, 1)
if 𝑥 ∈ [1, 1.5]

1

on the interval [0, 1.5], placing an atom of size 4 at one and an atom of size (

1.5−√1.5
2

) at

zero.
Figure 2.1 below shows the cost functions used in this example on the left-hand
side panel while the cumulative distribution functions calculated above are plotted on the
right-hand side panel. The solid line represents Player 1’s cost function and cumulative
distribution function in the respective panels, while the dotted line represents the same for
Player 2 in the respective panels.
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Figure 2.1 Cost Functions and Cumulative Distribution Functions
𝐶1 (𝑥) – solid line and 𝐶2 (𝑥) – dash line on the left panel
𝐹1 (𝑥) – solid line and 𝐹2 (𝑥) – dash line on the right panel
Next, we establish uniqueness of the conventional mixed-strategy NE in the
asymmetric two-player contest.
Theorem 2 If conditions (1) – (6) hold, then the conventional mixed-strategy equilibrium
is a unique NE in the asymmetric two-player contest.
The proof is standard and similar to the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 in Hillman
and Riley (1989) and thus is omitted. The following example shows that there can be a
pure-strategy NE if cost functions are left-continuous, or assumption (1) is violated.
Example 2. Suppose that 𝑉 = 1, 𝑠 = 0.1, and 𝑚 = 0.9, and
0.1𝑥,

if 𝑥 ∈ [0, 0.1],

0.1𝑥 + 0.9,

if 𝑥 ∈ (0.1, 1],

𝐶1 (𝑥) = 𝐶2 (𝑥) = {

Then, 𝑡2 = 1 = 𝑡1 , and conditions (2) – (6) hold.
Note that there exists a pure strategy equilibrium where both players bid
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𝑥1 = 𝑥2 = 0.1
and obtain expected payoffs
𝐸𝜋𝑖 (0.1, 0.1) = 0.5 − 0.01 = 0.49, for 𝑖 = 1, 2.
3.1 Aggregate Bids and Total Cost
Having determined the bidding behavior for the two players, we now focus on the
total cost in the asymmetric two-player contest with a soft cap. As discussed earlier, the
total cost, and the expected aggregate bids, as given below, are also important aspects of
an asymmetric contest.
𝑡2

𝑡2

𝑆𝑇𝐶 = ∫ 𝐶1 (𝑥) 𝑑𝐹1 (𝑥) + ∫ 𝐶2 (𝑥) 𝑑𝐹2 (𝑥),
0

0

and the expected aggregate bids
𝑡2

𝑡2

𝑆𝐴𝐵 = ∫ 𝑥 𝑑𝐹1 (𝑥) + ∫ 𝑥 𝑑𝐹2 (𝑥).
0

0

From Theorem 1,

𝑡2

1 𝑡2
∫ 𝐿 (𝑥) 𝑑𝐿2 (𝑥),
𝑉 0 1

𝑖𝑓 𝑡2 < 𝑠,
(10)

∫ 𝐶1 (𝑥) 𝑑𝐹1 (𝑥) =
0

1 𝑠
1 𝑡2
∫ 𝐿1 (𝑥) 𝑑𝐿2 (𝑥) + ∫ (𝐿1 (𝑥) +𝑚) 𝑑𝐿2 (𝑥),
𝑉 𝑠
{𝑉 0

𝑖𝑓 𝑡2 ≥ 𝑠,

and

𝑡2

1 𝑡2
∫ 𝐿 (𝑥) 𝑑𝐿1 (𝑥),
𝑉 0 2

𝑖𝑓 𝑡2 < 𝑠,
(11)

∫ 𝐶2 (𝑥) 𝑑𝐹2 (𝑥) =
0

1 𝑠
1 𝑡2
∫ 𝐿2 (𝑥) 𝑑𝐿1 (𝑥) + ∫ (𝐿2 (𝑥) +𝑚) 𝑑𝐿1 (𝑥),
𝑉 𝑠
{𝑉 0
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𝑖𝑓 𝑡2 ≥ 𝑠.

Therefore, we get the following result.
Theorem 3 The total cost is
𝐶1 (𝑡2 ),

𝑖𝑓 𝑡2 < 𝑠
(12)

𝑆𝑇𝐶 =
𝑚
𝐶1 (𝑡2 ) − (𝐿1 (𝑠) + 𝐿2 (𝑠) + 𝑚),
{
𝑉

𝑖𝑓 𝑡2 ≥ 𝑠

The total cost is maximized, if there is no soft cap, or 𝑚 = 0. The expected aggregate bids
are independent from the soft cap,

𝑆𝐴𝐵 =

𝑡2
𝑡2
1
(𝑡2 (𝐿1 (𝑡2 ) + 𝐿2 (𝑡2 )) − (∫ 𝐿1 (𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ 𝐿2 (𝑥)𝑑𝑥)) .
𝑉
0
0

(13)

The following example illustrates the theorem.
Example 3. Suppose that 𝑉 = 2, 𝑚 = 0, 𝐶1 (𝑥) = √𝑥, and 𝐶2 (𝑥) = 𝑥.
Then, 𝑡2 = 2 < 4 = 𝑡1 and conditions (1) – (6) hold. From Corollary 2, in the conventional
mixed-strategy NE, Player 1 randomizes according to the following cumulative
distribution function
1
𝐹1 (𝑥) = 𝑥,
2
on the interval [0, 2], and Player 2 randomizes according to the following cumulative
distribution function
𝐹2 (𝑥) =

2 − √2 1
+ √𝑥
2
2
2−√2

on the interval [0, 2], placing an atom of size (

2

) at zero. From (12), the total cost is

𝑆𝑇𝐶 = 𝐶1 (𝑡2 ) = √2 ≈ 1.41.
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From (13), the expected aggregate bids are
𝑡2
𝑡2
1
(𝑥)
𝑆𝐴𝐵 = (∫ 𝑥 𝑑𝐿2
+ ∫ 𝑥 𝑑𝐿1 (𝑥))
𝑉 0
0

=

𝑡2
𝑡2
1
(𝑡2 (𝐿1 (𝑡2 ) + 𝐿2 (𝑡2 )) − (∫ 𝐿1 (𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ 𝐿2 (𝑥)𝑑𝑥))
𝑉
0
0

1
2 3
22
𝑆𝐴𝐵 = (2(√2 + 2) − ( 2(2) + )) ≈ 1.47.
2
3
2
Now, suppose that a soft cap is introduced. From Example 1, 𝑚 = 0.5, and 𝑠 = 1,
√𝑥,

if 𝑥 < 1,

𝐶1 (𝑥) = {
√𝑥 + 0.5, if 𝑥 ≥ 1,
and
𝑥,

if 𝑥 < 1,

𝐶2 (𝑥) = {
𝑥 + 0.5, if 𝑥 ≥ 1.
Then, 𝑡2 = 1.5 < 2.25 = 𝑡1 . and conditions (1) – (6) hold. In the conventional mixedstrategy NE, Player 1 randomizes according to the following cumulative distribution
function

𝐹1 (𝑥) =

1
𝑥,
2
1
1
𝑥
+
,
{2
4
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if 𝑥 ∈ [0, 1),
if 𝑥 ∈ [1, 1.5],

1

on the interval [0, 1.5] placing an atom of size at one. Player 2 randomizes according to
4

the following cumulative distribution function
1.5 − √1.5 1
+ √𝑥,
2
2

𝐹2 (𝑥) =
{

2 − √1.5 1
+ √𝑥,
2
2

if 𝑥 ∈ [0, 1),
if 𝑥 ∈ [1, 1.5],

1

1.5−√1.5

on the interval [0, 1.5], placing an atom of size 4 at 1 and an atom of size (

2

From (12), the total cost is

𝑆𝑇𝐶 = 𝐶1 (𝑡2 ) −

𝑚
(𝐿 (𝑠) + 𝐿2 (𝑠) + 𝑚),
𝑉 1

𝑆𝑇𝐶 = √1.5 + 0.5 −

0.5
(1 + 1 + 0.5) ≈ 1.10.
2

From (13), the expected aggregate bids are
𝑡2
𝑡2
1
𝑆𝐴𝐵 = (∫ 𝑥 𝑑𝐿2 (𝑥) + ∫ 𝑥 𝑑𝐿1 (𝑥))
𝑉 0
0

=

𝑡2
𝑡2
1
(𝑡2 (𝐿1 (𝑡2 ) + 𝐿2 (𝑡2 )) − (∫ 𝐿1 (𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ 𝐿2 (𝑥)𝑑𝑥))
𝑉
0
0

3
1
2
1.52
𝑆𝐴𝐵 = (1.5(1.5 + √1.5) − ( 1.5(2) +
)) ≈ 0.87.
2
3
2

Note here that both, the total cost and aggregate bids decrease when a soft cap is
introduced.
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) at zero.

4. Conclusions
We have shown that a two player asymmetric contest can be modeled as one where
the players have the same valuation of the prize, but face different cost functions. This
provides an additional approach to modeling such contests compared to the existing
approach in the literature. The consistency of our results with those in the existing literature
show that our approach is viable and is successful in presenting an additional framework.
Additionally, the introduction of discontinuous cost functions in the model, and using them
capture the ‘jump’ in costs that a player would face when there is a penalty imposed on
breaching a certain spending limit, is another contribution to the literature.
Using our model, we have also explored the various policy options around the
imposition of an exogenous cap on bids, which organizers face when conducting such
contests. We consider the impact such policy has on the total cost to the players and
aggregate bids made by them. We show that, in terms of increasing the total cost faced by
the players, a policy of no cap on bids strictly dominates the one with a soft cap on bids
with a penalty for breaching the cap. While Kaplan and Wettstein (2006), and Olszewski
and Siegel (2019) show that a soft cap has no effect on total cost; Che and Gale (2006)
show an increase in total cost for a soft cap with non-monetary penalties. Our findings on
the other hand, show that implementing a soft cap on bids would decrease the total cost
faced by the players. We believe that our findings are more intuitive as discussed below.
On expected aggregate bids made by players, Example 3 shows that, the aggregate
bids reduce upon the implementation of a soft cap on bids. Our findings, in the context of

18

aggregate bids, support those of Kaplan and Wettstein (2006), and Olszewski and Siegel
(2019).
A. Cap on bids and competition
While analyzing various policies regarding caps on bids in an asymmetric contest,
it may be fruitful to generally consider the effect of such policies on how competitive they
may, or may not, make the contest itself. With there being no cap on bids, the most efficient
(advantaged) player has a clear advantage. Such players may be advantaged in terms of
certain reputational, experiential, or financial factors. This would provide the less efficient
player with few incentives to bid high, knowing this, the most efficient player will also not
bid as high as they could have. There is nonetheless, still a non-zero possibility that the less
efficient player could bid high and catch the most efficient player unaware and win the
contest. However, when a policy of a soft cap on bids is implemented, so that any player
who bids above a certain capped amount would be required to pay a monetary fine, then
only the most efficient player would take that the opportunity to bid close to the cap, or
even breach the cap. The less efficient player would have less inclination to bid close to
the capped amount where they could lose to the more efficient player(s); and have even
less of a proclivity to breach the cap. Knowing this, even the more efficient player(s) would
then not bid large amounts. As a consequence, both, the expected aggregate bids and the
total cost, which is a function of the bids, would therefore decrease in this situation
compared to the policy of no cap on bids, where the less efficient player(s) does not need
to contend with the possibility of an imminent penalty upon bidding in excess of a specific
amount.
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B. Total Cost and Aggregate Bids
As has been discussed earlier in the introduction, total cost and aggregate bids may
be of interest to both organizers and player. We have shown the effect that a soft cap on
bids has on the two. Our results imply that if an organizer would want to lower the cost to
players, then they should implement a soft cap on bids, that however, would lead to a
decrease in expected aggregate bids. On the other hand, if an organizer would like to
increase aggregate bids, then going for a no cap on bids option would be her choice, that
however, maximizes the total cost for the players or the participants.
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Table 2.1 Summary of results pertaining to a soft cap on bids.
This table summarizes our findings with regards to soft cap on bids, and compares it with
previous literature on this subject.

Che and
Gale
(1998)

Kaplan and
Wettstein
(2006)

Olszewski
Che and Gale
and Siegel
(2006)
(2019)

This paper

Effect on Aggregate Cost

Soft Cap

--

No Effect

Monetary
fine: No
Effect
Nonmonetary
penalty:
Increases

No Cap

--

--

--

No Effect

Decreases

--

Dominates

Effect on Aggregate Bids
Soft Cap

--

Decreases

--

Decreases

Decreases

No Cap

--

Dominates

--

--

Dominates
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CHAPTER 3
ASYMMETRIC CONTESTS WITH A RIGID CAP ON BIDS
1. Introduction
The costs in a contest such as a lobbying or a political campaign can be substantially
high at times, where the contestants can be spending large sums in order to win the contest.
This has been quite apparent in election campaigns in the United States, where the costs of
running a campaign has been increasing over the years. Such increase in campaign
spending can be quite wasteful, as it would require a politician to considerably increase
fund-raising efforts, which may come at cost of other significant activities. Additionally, a
donor could appropriate undue influence on electoral outcomes, or on policy positions by
making a large enough campaign contribution (Che and Gale, 1998). Such situations may
also give one contestant, an undue advantage over another. Similar situations could also
exit in the field of professional team sports. A team may be able to significantly outspend
another, and thereby purchase many extremely expensive players, potentially giving them
extraordinary advantage over other teams. Despite such a variety of scenarios, a cap on
spending has conventionally been argued for as a way of providing a level playing field to
contestants of varying capabilities. In this paper we consider a two-player asymmetric
contest with a single prize. A rigid cap is placed on the amount that the players can bid.
In addition to their being contestants, contests also tend to have other interested
parties whom we may call organizer(s). It is possible, that the organizer(s) might desire for
22

the contestants to incur a high cost in preparation for a contest. The organizer might use
the cost incurred by the contestant as a signal of their intent. A firm wanting to build its
new corporate office might prefer various architecture firms in competition for the project,
to be as elaborate and detailed in their plans and designs for the new corporate office.
Conversely, the organizer might want contestants to incur as low a cost as possible in
preparation for a contest, but would prefer the contestants to expend maximum effort
during the contest. This is the distinction between aggregate cost, that contestants incur in
participating in the contest, and aggregate bids which is the amount or effort that players
expend as they compete.
2. Literature
Che and Gale (1998) was amongst the first papers to formally analyze model a
contest with caps. They model a contest as a complete information two-player all-pay
auction where players have different valuations for the same prize and their bid is the cost
they incur in participating in the contest. They consider a rigid cap on bids which simply
cannot be breached. As their model considers the cost to be the bid, there is no distinction
between aggregate cost, and aggregate bids. They find that a small rigid cap on bids leads
to an increases in aggregate cost in the contest, which is the same as an increase in
aggregate bids as per their model. Kaplan and Wettstein (2006) in response point out that
more often than not, there is a fine or a penalty associated with the breaching of a cap on
bids, and so a soft, and not a rigid cap is more commonplace. They model the costs incurred
by players as strictly increasing continuous functions of the bid amount. They argue that
bidding without cap stochastically dominates bidding with a (soft) cap, and that the
imposition of a soft cap does not affect aggregate costs but always reduces expected bids.
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They further argue that monetary fines could be welfare enhancing, while non-monetary
fines like banning a team may be detrimental. In their response, Che and Gale (2006)
discuss and argue that the aggregate costs increase due cost-equalizing shifts when players
face different cost functions. They further show that monetary fines have no effect on
expected aggregate cost, while a nonmonetary penalty generates strictly higher expected
aggregate cost. In a more recent paper, Olszewski and Siegel (2019) look at the effect of
both, rigid and soft caps on the aggregate costs incurred by, and aggregate bids made by
contestants in large all-pay auction contests; where a large number of heterogeneous
contestants compete for a large number of prizes. They conclude that as far as aggregate
costs are concerned, flexible caps have next to no effect, but rigid caps always lower
aggregate costs. Rigid caps also decrease aggregate bids when cost functions are linear or
concave, but could increase aggregate bids for convex cost functions in some conditions.
Flexible caps on the other hand, always decrease aggregate bids. Their approach is different
from the studies mentioned earlier, in that, they consider a situation with 𝑛 number of
players and 𝑛 number of prizes, while earlier studies are 2-player games with a single prize
and 2-valuations of that prize. Furthermore, Olszewski and Siegel (2019) use an assortative
allocation to award 𝑛 prizes to 𝑛 players based on their bid. The authors do have a similarity
with earlier works as each player faces strictly increasing and continuous cost functions
under all circumstances. These studies show there to be some ambiguity around the effects
of a cap on bids9, 10. In this study we focus on rigid cap on bids, that cannot be breached.

9

Pastine and Pastine (2013) extended Kaplan and Wettstein (2006) and Che and Gale (2006) by incorporating
politician preferences into their framework.
10
Other studies look at the Caps in Contests from different angles. Gavious, Moldovanu, and Sela (2002)
study private-information contests with caps. Szech (2015) revisits Che and Gale (1998) and analyzes
different tie-breaking rules.
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Our study sits well with the discussion initiated by Che and Gale (1998) and carried
forward by Kaplan and Wettstein (2006), and Che and Gale (2006). Our findings support
Kaplan and Wettstein (2006) when they say that bidding without a cap strictly dominates
bidding with a soft cap on bids. We further are in agreement with Kaplan and Wettstein
(2006), and Olszewski and Siegel (2019), in so far as the decrease in aggregate bids is
concerned when a soft cap in implemented. However, we show that aggregate costs
decrease when a soft cap with a monetary fine is implemented, while both, Kaplan and
Wettstein (2006), and Olszewski and Siegel (2019), argue that a soft cap has no effect on
aggregate costs. These results are highlighted in Table 1.
We model an asymmetric contest as an all-pay auction where the players have the
same valuation of the prize, but different right-continuous cost functions. In doing so, we
seek to capture the ‘jump’, or the discontinuity in the costs owing to a non-rigid fine or a
soft cap being implemented.
It is standard in the literature to model asymmetric contests as all-pay auctions
where players have different valuation of a single prize and the same linear cost functions,
and to obtain conventional mixed-strategy equilibria, where the most efficient player
obtains a positive expected payoff, and the other players get expected zero payoffs. See,
for example, Hillman and Riley (1989), Baye, Kovenock, and De Vries (1993, 1996). 11 A
typical assumption in this literature is that cost functions are twice continuously
differentiable.

11

Siegel (2009, 2010, 2014) considers general contests with continuous cost functions.
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We provide sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the conventional mixed-strategy
equilibrium in our setting. This equilibrium is qualitatively different from equilibria in
previous studies. Moreover, we construct the conventional mixed-strategy equilibrium
even if different players have caps at different points and the number of such caps is finite.
First, we analyze two-player asymmetric contests. We show that there exists the
conventional mixed-strategy equilibrium. However, there might be pure-strategy equilibria
in our model, if the assumption about the right-continuity of the cost functions is violated,
Example 2 illustrates that situation.
3. Asymmetric Two-Player Contest with a Rigid Cap
We will consider a rigid cap on bids now. We define a ‘rigid’ cap on bids as the
maximum bid permissible. Each player 𝑖 can bid a positive amount 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝑟 in the contest,
where 𝑟 > 0 is the rigid cap on bids. Suppose that two players contest a prize 𝑉 > 0. The
value of the prize is same for both players, but the players’ cost functions can be different
and satisfy the following conditions
𝐿1 (𝑥) ≤ 𝐿2 (𝑥),

(1)

𝐿1 (0) = 𝐿2 (0) = 0

(2)

with,

𝐿𝑖 (𝑥) is strictly increasing functions for 𝑖 = 1, 2,

(3)

We assume that there exists 0 < 𝑡𝑖 < ∞ such that
𝐿𝑖 (𝑡𝑖 ) = 𝑉 for 𝑖 = 1, 2,
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(4)

and
(5)

𝑡2 ≤ 𝑡1 .
based on which, we call Player 1 more efficient player.

Each player 𝑖 exerts effort 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0 in order to win the prize in the all-pay auction
and obtains the following payoff

𝑢𝑖 (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 ) =

−𝐿𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 ) ,

if 𝑥𝑖 < 𝑥−𝑖 ,

𝑉
− 𝐿𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 ) ,
2

if 𝑥1 = 𝑥2 ,

{ 𝑉 − 𝐿𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 ) ,

if 𝑥𝑖 > 𝑥−𝑖 .

(6)

In this setting, where (1) – (6) hold, and
𝑟 < 𝑡2 .

(7)

3.1 Small Rigid Cap
It is intuitively clear that both players make every possible effort if the rigid cap on
bids is small enough. Denote
𝑉
𝑉
𝑉
−1
−1
𝑟0 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 {𝐿−1
1 ( ) , 𝐿2 ( )} = 𝐿2 ( ) < 𝑡2 .
2
2
2

(8)

We get the following result,
Theorem 1 if conditions (1) – (5) and
0 < 𝑟 ≤ 𝑟0
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(9)

hold, then there exists a pure-strategy NE in which each player submits a bid of r in the
asymmetric two-player contest with a rigid cap.
3.2 Large Rigid Cap
Suppose the rigid cap 𝑟, is “large”, and given as
𝑟0 < 𝑟 < 𝑡2 .

(10)

It is obvious here that both players cannot bid the cap level in an equilibrium as at least one
of them will get a negative payoff. We can describe the mixed-strategy in our setting now.
Theorem 2 If conditions (1) – (5), and (10) hold, then there exists a mixed-strategy NE in
the asymmetric two-player contest with a rigid cap, 𝑟, where Player 1 randomizes
according to the following cumulative distribution function.

𝐻1 (𝑥) =

1
𝐿 (𝑥),
𝑉 2

(11)

on the interval [0, 𝑡] placing an atom at 𝑥 = 𝑟; and Player 2 randomizes according to the
following cumulative distribution function
𝐻2 (𝑥) =

𝑉 − (2𝐿1 (𝑟) − 𝐿1 (𝑡)) 1
+ 𝐿1 (𝑥),
𝑉
𝑉

(12)

on the interval [0, 𝑡], placing an atom at zero and at 𝑥 = 𝑟. Where
𝑡 = 𝐿−1
2 (2𝐿2 (𝑟) − 𝑉)
Consider the following example
1

Example 1. Suppose that 𝑉 = 1, 𝐿1 (𝑥) = 2 𝑥, and 𝐿2 (𝑥) = 𝑥.
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(13)

Then, 𝑡2 = 1 < 2 = 𝑡1 and conditions (1) – (5) hold. From (11) and (12), in the
conventional mixed-strategy NE, Player 1 randomizes according to the following
cumulative distribution function:
𝐻1 (𝑥) = 𝑥,
on the interval [0, 1]. Player 2 randomizes according to the following cumulative
distribution function
1
1
𝐻2 (𝑥) = (1 − ) + 𝑥,
2
2
1

on the interval [0, 1], placing an atom of size 2 at zero.

Figure 3.1 Cost Functions and Cumulative Distribution Functions
𝐿1 (𝑥) – solid line and 𝐿2 (𝑥) – dash line on the left panel
𝐻1 (𝑥) – solid line and 𝐻2 (𝑥) – dash line on the right panel
Note that
𝑉
𝑉
−1
𝑟0 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 {𝐿−1
1 ( ) , 𝐿2 ( )} ,
2
2
1
1
𝑟0 = {1, } = .
2
2
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So, if the rigid cap 𝑟 ≤ 𝑟0 , then Theorem 1 describes a pure strategy NE.
Consider

𝑟=

3
.
4
3

Theorem 2 describes a mixed strategy NE, where both player will put an atom at 𝑟 = 4 ,
but the size of these atoms have to be less than one.

Figure 3.2 Cost Functions and Cumulative Distribution Functions
𝐿1 (𝑥) – solid line and 𝐿2 (𝑥) – dash line on the left panel
𝐻1 (𝑥) – solid line and 𝐻2 (𝑥) – dash line on the right panel
From condition (13), we get
3
1
𝑡 = 𝐿−1
2 (2𝐿2 ( ) − 1) =
4
2
Therefore, there exists a mixed-strategy NE, where Player 1 randomizes according to the
following cumulative distribution function
𝐻1 (𝑥) = 𝑥,
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1

3

2

4

on the interval [0, ] placing an atom at 𝑥 = 𝑟 = ; and Player 2 randomizes according to
the following cumulative distribution function
1 1
+ 𝑥,
2 2

𝐻2 (𝑥) =

1

1

3

on the interval [0, 2], placing an atom of size 2 at zero and at 𝑥 = 𝑟 = 4 .
3.3 Aggregate Bids and Total Cost
We can now determine the total cost in the asymmetric two-player contest with a
rigid cap
𝑟

𝑟

𝑅𝑇𝐶(𝑟) = ∫ 𝐿1 (𝑥) 𝑑𝐻1 (𝑥) + ∫ 𝐿2 (𝑥) 𝑑𝐻2 (𝑥),
0

0

and the expected aggregate bids
𝑟

𝑟

𝑅𝐴𝐵(𝑟) = ∫ 𝑥 𝑑𝐻1 (𝑥) + ∫ 𝑥 𝑑𝐻2 (𝑥).
0

0

For both the expressions above, the first term gives the total cost (or expected
aggregate bids) for Player 1, and the second term gives the same for Player 2.
3.3.1 Small Rigid Cap
Suppose that condition (9) holds, then
𝑅𝑇𝐶(𝑟) = 𝐿1 (𝑟) + 𝐿2 (𝑟),
and
𝑅𝐴𝐵(𝑟) = 2𝑟.
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The total cost and the expected aggregate bids are maximized at 𝑟 = 𝑟0 , or
max 𝑅𝑇𝐶(𝑟) = 𝐿1 (𝑟0 ) + 𝐿2 (𝑟0 ) ,

0≤𝑟≤𝑟0

and
max 𝑅𝐴𝐵(𝑟) = 2𝑟0 .

0≤𝑟≤𝑟0

3.3.2 Large Rigid Cap
Suppose that condition (10) holds, then we get the following result.
Theorem 3 The total costs are
𝑖𝑓 0 < 𝑟 ≤ 𝑟0 < 𝑡2 ,

𝐿1 (𝑟) + 𝐿2 (𝑟),

(14)

𝑅𝑇𝐶(𝑟) = {
𝑖𝑓 𝑟0 < 𝑟 < 𝑡2 ,

2𝐿1 (𝑟) − 𝐿1 (𝑡),
and the aggregate bids are

𝑖𝑓 0 < 𝑟 ≤ 𝑟0 < 𝑡2 ,

2𝑟,
𝑅𝐴𝐵(𝑟) =

𝑡
1
(𝑡)
(𝑡))
+ 𝐿2
− ∫ (𝐿1 (𝑥) + 𝐿2 (𝑥))𝑑𝑥 )
(𝑡(𝐿1
𝑉
0
+ 𝑟(2 − 𝐻1 (𝑡) − 𝐻2 (𝑡)),
{

where 𝑡 is defined in (13).
The following examples illustrates.
Example 2. Suppose that 𝑉 = 10, 𝐿1 (𝑥) = 𝑥 ≤ 2𝑥 = 𝐿2 (𝑥).
Then
𝑡2 = 5 < 10 = 𝑡1 ,
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(15)
𝑖𝑓 𝑟0 < 𝑟 < 𝑡2

𝑉
𝑟0 = 𝐿−1
2 ( ) = 2.5,
2
and
𝑡 = 𝐿−1
2 (2𝐿2 (𝑟) − 𝑉) = 2𝑟 − 5.
The total cost is then given as
3𝑟,

𝑖𝑓 0 < 𝑟 ≤ 2.5,

5,

𝑖𝑓 2.5 < 𝑟 < 5.

2𝑟,

𝑖𝑓 0 < 𝑟 ≤ 2.5,

3.75,

𝑖𝑓 2.5 < 𝑟 < 5.

𝑅𝑇𝐶(𝑟) = {

and the expected aggregate bids are

𝑅𝐴𝐵(𝑟) = {

Furthermore, following on from the analysis conducted in chapter 1, for a situation where
there is no cap on bids, the total cost is given as
𝑇𝐶 = 𝐶1 (𝑡2 ) = 5,
and the expected aggregate bids are
𝑡2
𝑡2
1
(𝑥)
𝐴𝐵 = (∫ 𝑥 𝑑𝐿2
+ ∫ 𝑥 𝑑𝐿1 (𝑥))
𝑉 0
0

=

𝑡2
𝑡2
1
(𝑡2 (𝐿1 (𝑡2 ) + 𝐿2 (𝑡2 )) − (∫ 𝐿1 (𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ 𝐿2 (𝑥)𝑑𝑥))
𝑉
0
0

𝐴𝐵 =

1
52
52
(5(5 + 10) − ( + 2 )) = 3.75.
10
2
2
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Note that the total cost with no cap on bids, is the same as that with a large rigid cap, and
less than the expected revenue with a small rigid cap in place. Additionally, for a small
rigid cap, the total cost and the expected aggregate bids are maximized at 𝑟 = 𝑟0 , or
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑇𝐶 = 𝐿1 (𝑟0 ) + 𝐿2 (𝑟0 ) = 7.5,
and
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝐴𝐵 = 2𝑟0 = 5.
This shows that both, the total cost, and expected aggregate bids are maximized at the level
of the small rigid cap when compared with a large rigid cap on bids, and when there are no
cap on bids.
The figure below plots the expected revenue as a function of a cap on bids when both
players face linear cost functions. This plot is in agreement with Che and Gale (1998) who
obtain a similar plot for their formulation of cap on bids.

Figure 3.3 Aggregate Cost and Aggregate Bids for a Rigid Cap on bids
Aggregate Cost vs. size of Rigid Cap (𝑟) – on the left panel
Aggregate Bids vs. size of Rigid Cap (𝑟) – on the right panel
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4. Conclusions
Using our model, we have also explored the various policy options around the
imposition of an exogenous cap on bids, which organizers face when conducting such
contests. We consider the impact such policy has on the total cost to the players and
aggregate bids made by them. We show that, in terms of increasing the total cost and
expected aggregate bids made by players, a policy of small rigid cap on bids strictly
dominates over one with no cap on bids. Our findings support Che and Gale (1998) show
an increase in total cost for a soft cap with non-monetary penalties. These findings are
summarized in Table. 3.1.
Considering various policy options with regards to a rigid cap on bids, a large rigid
cap on bids, may dissuade competition by allowing greater leeway to the more efficient
player, who could outbid the less efficient player at larger amounts, thereby making the
less efficient player not only to be less willing to bid large amounts, but also be more
inclined to not participate. Knowing this, the more efficient player would likely bid
amounts lower than otherwise. On the other hand, a small rigid cap may have the effect of
making competition more even for both players to bid, resulting in an increase in total cost
and expected aggregate bids.
As has been discussed earlier in the introduction, total cost and aggregate bids may
be of interest to both organizers and player. An organizer would be indifferent between a
large cap on bids and no cap on bids from the point of view total cost and aggregate bids.
A small rigid cap is more likely to generate higher total cost and higher expected aggregate
bids.
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Table 3.1 Summary of results pertaining to a rigid cap on bids
This table summarizes our findings with regards to rigid cap on bids, and compares it with
previous literature on this subject.
Che and
Gale
(1998)

Kaplan and
Wettstein
(2006)

Che and
Gale
(2006)

Olszewski
and Siegel
(2019)

This paper

Aggregate Costs
Rigid Cap

--

--

Increases

Decreases

No Cap

--

Dominates

--

--

Increases
for small
rigid cap
Same as
large rigid
cap

Aggregate Bids
Rigid Cap

No Cap

Increase

--

--

Decreases

--

Dominates

--

--
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Increases
for small
rigid cap
Same as
large rigid
cap

CHAPTER 4
INTERNAL MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION IN INDIA
1. Introduction
Since the end of the Second World War, the world population has been urbanizing
at a continuous rate. According to the World Urbanization Prospects 2014 report
commissioned by the UN, while 30% of the world population in 1950 was urbanized, this
figure stood at 54% in 2014, and is projected that by 2050, close to two-thirds of the global
population will be residing in urban settings. Given the current levels of urbanization in
the rest of the world, much of the growth in urbanization would come from Africa and
Asia. The UN in its report expects about 37% of this projected growth to come from just
three countries viz. India, China, and Nigeria. Discussions focused around this trend of
increasing urbanization eventually bring into picture, the enchanting notion of megacities
around the world, especially in Asia with cities like Tokyo, Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou,
Mumbai, Delhi, Dhaka etc. capturing imaginations with their already massive populations,
and predictions of unprecedentedly large conurbations. However, as noted by the UN in
the aforementioned report, the fastest growing urban agglomerations are not the mega, but
the medium-sized cities.
Urbanization in India in the 20th Century
The close relationship between urbanization and economic development has long
been understood. As the economy of a country grows, cities develop as centers of trade and
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commerce, and allied services. India is no exception to that phenomenon. Urban population
in India has grown since at least the late 19th century when regular population census was
instituted under the British Raj. The British were instrumental in the building and
establishment of cities like Kolkata (Calcutta), Mumbai (Bombay), and Chennai (Madras)
as port cities open to international trade. These port cities attracted manual labor for loading
and unloading the ships, for handling the cargo, and the like. These cities also attracted
various business communities from across the country, and the literate others who could
work as accountants, managers, supervisors at the docks, warehouses (godowns) etc. The
British also played an important role in increasing the prominence of existing older cities
like Bengaluru (Bangalore) and Pune, which owing to their relatively pleasant climate and
relative proximity to Bombay in the case of Pune, and to Madras in the case of Bangalore,
made for substantial British settlements, leading eventually to the establishment of some
prominent military, medical, educational and other institutes in Bengaluru and Pune. The
British rule, unlike what many might imagine, was not uniform across the entire Indian
subcontinent. Although there were large parts of what is now India, directly controlled and
ruled over by the British, there were equally large parts that were not under direct British
rule, but were controlled indirectly by subjugation and acquiescence of local rulers or
‘princes’. While the local princes had nominal powers, the cities under their rule did not
“enjoy” the same facilities as those that were directly ruled by the British. An example of
this is the establishment of ‘railway towns’, which almost exclusively were located in the
territory ruled over by the British directly. The partition of India in 1947 (essentially the
partition of the north-western region of Punjab and the eastern region of Bengal) saw the
population of many cities in what became northern, western, eastern, and central India
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increase sharply owing to the influx of refugees from what became Pakistan. The
population of Delhi, for example, almost doubled in the census period of 1941 – 1951,
from being under a million in 1941 to being under two million in 1951. This study will not
be focusing on this episodic spike in urban population. Given this historical background to
the process of urbanization in India, we now proceed to talk about processes closer to the
present time.
In the period after 1947 with India gaining independence, cities mentioned above
and a few others, therefore had a head start of sorts, relative to cities that were not under
direct British rule. These cities had better infrastructure, higher quality of human capital
(both, educationally, and entrepreneurially) and no surprise then that many of these cities
are among the largest cities in India today.
Linguistic Diversity in India
A development, which may seem unrelated to the discussion on urbanization is the
laying down of India’s federal structure of administrative units. The drafters of the
Constitution of India were keen to take what to them, was best in the American Constitution
among others such documents from around the world, and what they had been familiar
with under the British Parliamentary system. This led to the creation of States in India as
the second level of administration, much like in the United States. However, unlike in the
Unites States, there are multiple languages spoken in India, many with their own scripts
and grammar, which distinguishes India even from much of Europe where for example,
English, French, German, and Italian are all written in the Latin script with relatively minor
differences in the alphabet. A person from England, for example, can read most of what
might be written in Italian, they may not know the meaning of the words or how to
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pronounce the words correctly. In India however, there are sixty languages with numerous
scripts that are spoken by at least 100,000 people and many other languages spoken by
smaller populations. In such a situation, there was a popular demand for language to be the
criteria for state formation, to which the government of the day reluctantly acceded. The
States Reorganisation Commission was created in 1953 to reorganize States on linguistic
basis. Andhra Pradesh was the first state to be created on this basis in 1956 with the
majority of its population speaking the state language – Telugu. Numerous states created
on linguistic basis followed Andhra Pradesh. The constitution of India currently recognizes
26 languages as official languages, while specifying that India has no national language.
Hindi, the language spoken by the largest share of the population, and English are to be
used by the Central (Federal, as per US terminology) Government and the Supreme Court
of India for official proceedings. An Indian bank note for example, carries on it the value
written in 17 languages in 12 different scripts including Hindi and English as the most
prominent ones. This study argues that the linguistic diversity, specifically the linguistic
nature of Indian states is an important factor to be considered in the urbanization process
in India. Unlike other large countries like the US, China, or Brazil for example, India does
not have a single language that can be designated as the lingua franca. It is therefore
understandable why this aspect of India could, and does get overlooked, and so it seems
worthwhile to look into the evolving urbanization patterns in India in that context and pay
closer attention to such factors that on surface perhaps, even seem immaterial.
2. Literature Review
In the most recent study relevant to this inquiry, Chauvin et al. (2017) look into
urbanization across four countries viz. Brazil, China, India, and the United States. The
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study concludes that both China and India have fewer extremely large cities than would be
predicted by Zipf’s law. Chauvin et al. also show that despite increasing urbanization in
the country, labor mobility in India is very low. They find the low rates of migration within
India as “puzzling” given the rapid growth of cities. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2009) also
find the mobility rate to be low in India and attribute that to the informal risk-sharing within
caste networks, wherein, if an individual were to migrate, and move away from their caste
network, they would lose the insurance or security provided by their local caste network.
The discussion in Morten (2013) on the other hand, suggests that low mobility numbers for
India are likely due to measurement errors and that the Indian data understates the actual
numbers. This would address the paradox of fast growth of cities despite recorded low
mobility. Also related to the issue of measurement errors and understating of actual
numbers, Tumbe (2016) draws attention to the role played by definitions. According
to him, India uses a rather conservative approach when it comes to defining and
classifying of what is ‘urban’ and what is ‘rural’. As a result, many towns and villages
in India that would be classified as ‘urban’ in other countries, get classified as ‘rural’ in
India. A more liberal definition in keeping with practices in much of the world would see
the urbanization rate in India increase from 31% in 2011 to 47%. Keeping in mind the
fast growth of cities in India, Jedwab and Vollrath (2016) also draw attention to high
fertility rates, which would also explain fast urban growth regardless of mobility. This
paper seeks to add another dimension, namely linguistic diversity, to the discussion
around mobility, or the lack thereof, in India. As has been discussed above, given the
linguistically organized states in India, immigration would be hampered across state
borders. An individual would be less likely to go to another state where the language is
different from the one spoken within his
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or her native state. On the other hand, migration within a state would be much more
significant than migration across states.
In addition to highlighting the puzzling nature of mobility in India, Chauvin et al.
(2017) also show that there is a very high wage premium for urban areas in India compared
to the United Sates, Brazil, and China. The finding that there exists a very high urban wage
premium, raises further questions. A simple question is that if urban wage premium is very
high, then the rate of urbanization should at least not be as low as it is in India. Due the
absence of any verifiable explanation, the authors suggest that the high urban wage
premium indicates much higher human capital levels, especially educational attainment, in
urban Indians than their rural compatriots. Another plausible explanation according to them
could be down to poor data. This paper explores the possibility of another language-based
explanation, this time to do with proficiency in English, to look into the high urban wage
premium. We argue that English-language skills can be considered as a form of human
capital, the possession of which allows for a better paying job. It is widely acknowledged
from anecdotal evidence that English language skills are considered valuable in India.
Studies like Roy (2004) finds that as a result of the change in medium of instruction in
West Bengal public primary schools from English to Bengali in 1983, parents spent more
on private tutors, presumably to provide English lessons. This shows the value attached to
English language education. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) and Chakraborty and Kapur
(2016), both estimate the returns to attending a school with English (as opposed to some
Indian language) as the medium of instruction. Munshi and Rosenzweig collected their
own data on Marathi-speakers living in Dadar, which is located in Mumbai, Maharashtra,
India. Using data on parents' income histories and the language of instruction in their
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secondary school (Marathi or English), they estimate significant positive returns to an
English-medium education. Attending an English-medium school increased both women's
and men's income by about 25% in 2000. Chakraborty and Bakshi (2016) use National
Sample Survey data to estimate the impact of a 1983 policy in West Bengal which
eliminated English as the medium of instruction in primary schools. They find that
switching from English to Bengali medium of instruction significantly reduced wages.
Simple comparisons of cohorts attending primary school before and after the policy change
suggest that English-medium schooling raised wages about 15% in the 2000s. while these
studies highlight the importance and value of English language education, this study is
more closely related to those done by Shastry (2012) who finds that Indian districts whose
population's mother tongue is more linguistically dissimilar to Hindi attract more
information technology (IT) jobs, which she attributes to the lower cost of learning
English12. Then she finds that a greater IT presence is associated with a greater increase in
school enrollment and a smaller increase in the wage premium for educated workers in
districts where the mother tongue is more linguistically dissimilar to Hindi. However, she
does not have individual-level data on English-language skills her language variables are
at the district level and does not estimate returns to English proficiency per se.
Clingingsmith (2014) finds that districts that had greater increases in manufacturing
employment experienced greater increases in the proportion of minority-language speakers
becoming bilingual (where the second language is a regional or national language). Azam
et. al (2010) study the returns to English-language skills in India and find large difference
in earnings between those who do, and those who do not speak English. These results shed

12

The reasoning is that people whose native language is not Hindi or English will learn Hindi if their
mother tongue is very similar to Hindi and English otherwise.
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an important light on the processes of urbanization in India in absolute, and in comparative
terms. However, Chauvin et al. (2017) are unable to provide any substantial explanation
for these finding.
3. Research Question and Hypothesis
Some of the questions that we seek to address are those raised by Chauvin et al.
(2016) in that we wish to examine if linguistic diversity is a factor in labor mobility in the
Indian context. We contend that linguistic diversity in India does play a significant role in
determining the movement of people across India as it urbanizes, and that labor, especially,
poorer and low skilled, would be restricted in their mobility by linguistic boundaries.
Another question raised by Chauvin et al. (2017) is regarding very high urban wage
premium in India. We seek to explore a linguistic explanation for this phenomenon as well,
specifically, is there any correlation between the high wage premiums in urban areas to
English being predominantly an urban language? The argument here is that while poorer,
low-skilled workers might be limited in their mobility due to the linguistic diversity, the
more educated, middle, and lower-middle class workers can transcend such linguistic
boundaries owing to their better knowledge of the English language, and that such workers
drive up the urban wages.
4. Data
We use data from the 2011-12 India Human Development Survey (IHDS-II), a
nationally representative household data set collected by the National Council of Applied
Economic Research in New Delhi and the University of Maryland (Desai, Reeve and
NCAER 2011). IHDS-II covers 204,569 individuals located throughout India. One of the
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most relevant for us is that information pertaining to languages spoken, and read, and
especially each household member's ability to converse in English is collected. We are not
aware of any other large-scale individual-level data set in India that contains a measure of
English-language skills. Aggregated data from the census survey of India has been
employed to support the analysis carries out using the IHDS-II dataset. Data pertaining to
languages across India has been sourced from the 2011 census survey of India. The 2001
census survey is the most recent source for migration related aggregated data. Since the
outcome of interest is earnings, we restrict our sample to individuals aged 18 to 65.
In the following sections, we address the questions raised in section 4, viz., is there
a linguistic explanation for low mobility across India? And, does English language
proficiency explain high urban wage premium?
5. Mobility across State Borders in India
As per Chauvin et al. (2017), labor mobility in India is around 2%, the IHDS-II
dataset also reflects this, as has been shown in Table. 4.1. In this section, we will be looking
for a linguistic explanation for the low mobility in India. Specifically, is linguistic diversity
in India, a hindrance to mobility? The argument here is quite straightforward, in that, one
is less likely to migrate to a place(s) where the language spoken is different. In the Indian
context, where states are organized on a linguistic basis, the most widely spoken language
is Hindi (mother tongue in at least 10 states, and second language in some other states).
There are nonetheless many states with their own languages and scripts. Arguably, the
knowledge of English would allow an individual to transcend these linguistic barriers. The
IHDS-II dataset asks the respondents if they had left their homes in the last five years and
gone off to another state to look for temporary employment. In case the response is a yes,
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the next question pertains to the duration of time the respondent had been away. We carry
out a logistical regression approximated by the following equation:
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑖 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖

(1)

where 𝑌𝑖 is the binary response to the question whether individual 𝑖 temporarily migrated
out-of-state in the last five years or not. 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑖 is a binary dummy for English speaking
ability which is self-reported by individual 𝑖, 𝑋𝑖 are controls such as income, age, and
highest level of education. 𝛽 is the coefficient under consideration; it gives the loglikelihood of a ‘Yes’ response to the question, has an individual temporarily migrated outof-state in the last five years given that they possess English speaking abilities? The
individual respondents here are from both, urban and rural areas, and are also questioned
regarding the duration of time for which they temporarily migrated. These results are
shown in Table 4.2, with columns 1 through 3 show the log-likelihood of a temporary
migration across state borders from both rural and urban areas. Column 1 shows the results
in the case that the temporary migration was for a duration of less than 1 year; column 2,
when it was more than 1 year; and column 3, when the duration of the temporary migration
across state borders is for more than 2 years. For the results in these columns, we control
for income, highest level of education, and age, in addition to the English-speaking skills
for a male who is older than 24 years of age. Notice that while the coefficients for English
speaking ability are positive, they are not significant. Furthermore, columns 4, 5, and 6,
show the results of the logistic regression after dropping the highest level of education as
one of the controls. The coefficient for English speaking ability become even less
significant in this case. The log odds of temporarily migrating out-of-state in the last five
years for a duration of time more than 1 year, and more than 2 years increases for men
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above 24 years of age who can speak English. Coefficients for other explanatory variables
are insignificant. We can therefore conclude that while English speaking ability increases
the likelihood that an individual would temporarily migrate across state borders, it however
is not significant, and even less significant if one does not take into consideration the
highest level of education for the individuals. In addition to the logistic regression, we also
perform a Poisson regression for equation (1) and obtain the incident rate ratios, which are
contained in Table 4.3. The results show that the incident rate for English speakers is 1.1
times the incident rate for non-English speakers when it comes to migrating temporarily
across state borders, which is not significantly large.
We now consider Hindi language as a factor in movement across state borders. As
has been mentioned above, Hindi is the mother tongue of at least ten out of the 29 states,
and is a second language in some other states. That said, there are many states where Hindi
is neither the state-language, nor is it spoken or understood in any significant measure. We
therefore use as control, a binary variable for Hindi not as the official state language. The
binary variable takes the value 1, if Hindi is not the official state language, and zero
otherwise. A logistic regression is performed on the following equation (2):
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝐻𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖_𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖

(2)

where 𝑌𝑖 is the binary response to the question whether individual 𝑖 temporarily migrated
out-of-state in the last five years or not. 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑖 is a dummy for self-reported English
speaking ability as was the case with equation (1), 𝐻𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖_𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖 is the dummy for
whether the official language of a state 𝑖 is not Hindi. 𝑋𝑖 are controls such as income, age,
residence (urban or rural) and highest level of education. Results of the logistic regression
for equation (2) are presented in Table 4.4, where one can notice that Hindi not being the
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official language in a state is significant hurdle to the movement across state borders. The
coefficient for ‘Hindi not official state language’, is negative and highly significant for all
durations of temporary migrations as shown in columns (1), (2), and (3), of Table 4.4.
Moreover, upon controlling for Hindi as the official language at the state level, English
speaking ability is positive and significant at 5% level. The size of the coefficient rises
slightly with the duration, even as the coefficient for English speaking ability is
insignificant when the duration of temporary migration across state borders is less than 1
year. The result from Table 4.4 shows that for states where the official language (mother
tongue) is not Hindi, most migrants would come from within the state, and not outside the
state. This inference is corroborated by the 2011 census data for migrants across various
cities in India. Table 4.5 contains this information extracted from 2011 census survey of
India. This table does not include Delhi among the cities listed; this is because Delhi is
akin to a ‘city-state’, similar to the District of Columbia in the United States, where by its
very nature, most migrants come from outside the city. It is nonetheless, quite telling, that
even IT-Hubs like, Bangalore and Hyderabad have 56% and 81% of their long-term
immigrant residents respectively, from within the state instead of them belonging from
other parts of the country.
6. Human Capital and Migration in India
Chauvin et al. (2017) find substantial wage premium associated with Indian cities
as compared to cities in the US, Brazil, and China. They are however, unable to explain
why this might be the case. They speculate that this high wage premium in Indian cities
might point to some unobserved human capital. In this section we will attempt to explore
any relationship between human capital and urbanization in the Indian context. Such a

48

connection, we expect, will shed some light on the high wage premiums associated with
cities in India. The relationship between migrating to a city and human capital might be
approximated by the following equation (3):
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖

(3)

where 𝑌𝑖 is the binary choice variable of whether an individual 𝑖 migrated on a temporary
basis to an urban or a rural destination in the last five years. 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑖 is a dummy for
English

speaking

ability

of

an

individual

𝑖

which

is

self-reported.,

𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 for an individual 𝑖 is a measure of human capital that the
individual possesses. 𝑋𝑖 are controls such as income, age, residence (urban or rural). The
observations are restricted to males older than 24 years of age. Table 4.6 contains the results
of the logistic regression performed on equation (3). The results show that the coefficient
for 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 are strongly significant and positive. More educated
men who are more than 24 years old, are more likely to migrate temporarily to an urban
area for a duration of up to 1 year, and more than 1 year. Coefficient for the duration in
excess of 2 years is positive, but less significant. This might be due to small number of
observations. Furthermore, for those who reside in rural areas as well, better educated men
aged 24 years and above, are more likely to migrate temporarily to an urban area. As more
educated people move to the cities, this perhaps explains high wage premiums in Indian
cities. That said, cities in other parts of the world also attract more educated individuals
with specialist jobs opportunities. In the Indian context then, either more educated
individuals are a lot more scarce compared to other countries, or that there is a much greater
concentration of jobs requiring higher education in Indian cities compared to cities in other
countries. This requires further exploration, which is beyond this scope of this study. It is
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quite possible that both scenarios coexist. It is well known that for the most part of the last
70 years since India’s independence, the country has suffered from shoddy infrastructure
across the country of the most basic kind. This has over the years meant that many of the
jobs that do require a workforce that is well endowed in human capital, are concentrated in
a handful of cities where the infrastructure is relatively much better developed.
Furthermore, as has been shown in the previous section, mobility across state borders is
hindered by linguistic diversity. This would imply that well-educated individuals may not
migrate to different parts of the country in their job seeking efforts, and hence, there might
a scarcity of well-educated people in Indian cities, causing the wage for such individuals
to attract a significant premium.
7. Conclusion
We have tried to address some of the issues that had been raised by Chauvin et al.
(2016). In doing so, we have tried to consider linguistic diversity in India, and explore
aspects of human capital and its relationship with migration. We show that linguistic
diversity does affect the mobility of individuals across state borders in India. Specifically,
if Hindi is not the official language of a state, the individual residents find it quite a barrier
to overcome to be able to go to different parts of the country. Controlling for Hindi not
being a state’s official language, we find that the self-reported English speaking ability
positively affects mobility across state borders.
We also show that cities in India do attract the more highly educated individuals
including those from rural areas. This may be due to urban-rural disparity in terms of the
types of jobs available in each of these places. Certain jobs might almost be monopolized
in the urban areas, e.g. good university/academic jobs, which are almost exclusively in
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urban settings in India; and same is the case with hospitals, manufacturing, and IT related
industry. Cities in India have had the advantage over rural areas in terms of better basic
infrastructure, which has allowed for almost all of well-paying jobs that require higher
education, to be almost exclusively be based out of cities. Not to mention that if even the
well-educated individuals find it difficult to be mobile across state borders, then that may
create a shortage of well-educated workers, pushing the wages up, and therefore we find
substantial wage premium associated with Indian cities as compared cities in other parts of
the world. Finally, we would also like to mention some shortcomings of our study that are
borne out of the IHDS-II dataset. The dataset considers and reports on only those
individuals who migrated temporarily, and returned back to their own homes in the last
five years from the date of the interview. A more elaborate study would be able to include
migrants to Indian cities who have decided to stay and not return to their native towns and
villages. Currently the IHDS-II dataset does not allow for such an exploration. Another
issue with the dataset is that the number of observation reduces drastically as one tries to
include variables such as the self-reporting English speaking ability. Small numbers of
observations might lead to untrustworthy findings.
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Table 4.1 Temporary Migrant in the last five years
This table presents a summary of the number of individual respondents to the IHDS-II
survey who had migrated out of their place of residence temporarily in the last five years,
and have since returned.

No
Yes
Total

Frequency

Percentage

Cumulative

201,280

98.39

98.39

3,289

1.61

100.00

204, 569

100.00
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Table 4.2: Temporary Out-of-State Migration
This table shows the impact of various variables on the choice and the likelihood of an
individual to migrate outside their own state.
(1)

(2)

(3)

Duration
less than
1yr.
0.205
(0.133)

Duration
more than
1yr.
0.504*
(0.302)

Duration
more than
2yrs.
0.736*
(0.382)

Highest level
of education

-0.006
(0.011)

-0.025
(0.026)

-0.052
(0.035)

Log of income

-0.078*
(0.047)

-0.063
(0.110)

0.127
(0.153)

-0.084*
(0.046)

-0.083
(0.108)

0.100
(0.161)

Age

-0.012**
(0.005)

0.005
(0.011)

0.008
(0.015)

-0.011**
(0.004)

0.007
(0.011)

0.015
(0.019)

constant

1.470***
(0.520)

1.052
(1.280)

-1.073
(1.790)

1.486*** 1.049
(0.519) (1.285)

-1.299
(2.010)

2102

403

226

English

Obs.

(4)

(5)

(6)

Duration Duration Duration
less than more than more than
1yr.
1yr.
2yrs.
0.175
0.358
0.021
(0.120) (0.260) (0.411)

2102

403

148

Note: observations include males older than 24 yrs. of age, from both, rural and urban areas.
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Asterisks denote significance levels (* = 0.1, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01)
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Table 4.3: Temporary Out-of-State Migration Poisson Regression
This table shows results for a Poisson regression where each column reports the incident rate ratio
(IRR).

(1)

(2)

(3)

Duration
less than 1yr.
(IRR)

Duration
more than 1yr.
(IRR)

Duration
more than 2yrs.
(IRR)

English

1.093
(0.095)

1.204*
(0.216)

1.335*
(0.313)

Highest level of education

0.997
(0.007)

0.990
(0.016)

0.979
(0.022)

Log of income

0.966*
(0.030)

0.977*
(0.065)

1.052
(0.100)

Age

0.995**
(0.003)

1.002
(0.006)

1.003
(0.009)

constant

0.968***
(0.330)

0.762
(0.590)

0.330
(0.371)

2102

403

226

Obs.

Note: observations include males older than 24 years of age from both, rural and urban areas.
Standard errors in parenthesis
Asterisks denote significance levels (* = 0.1, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01)
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Table 4.4: Temporary out-of-state migration when Hindi not official state language
This table presents the result of a logistic regression carried out to ascertain the likelihood
that a man who is older than 24 years of age would migrate out-of-state. The table includes
the variable for Hindi to not be the official language in the state.

english

(1)
Duration
less than 1yr.
0.186
(0.140)

(2)
(3)
Duration
Duration
more than 1 yr. more than 2 yrs.
0.631**
0.927**
(0.314)
(0.402)

Highest level of education

0.010
(0.012)

-0.004
(0.027)

-0.037
(0.036)

Log of income

0.013
(0.050)

0.023
(0.117)

0.215
(0.166)

Urban residence

0.244
(0.151)

0.072
(0.347)

-0.228
(0.415)

-1.308***
(0.096)

-1.286***
(0.228)

-1.266***
(0.304)

Age

-0.007
(0.005)

0.011
(0.012)

0.015
(0.016)

constant

0.776
(0.550)

0.289
(1.359)

-1.741
(1.927)

2102

403

226

Hindi not official state language

Obs.

Note: observations include males older than 24 years of age from both, rural and urban areas.

Standard errors are in parenthesis
Asterisks denote significance levels (* = 0.1, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01)
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Table 4.5 Share of Total Migrants from within India for selected large cities.
This table presents a snapshot of the share of total immigrants, both recent, and long-term,
who migrate to a large city from either within the same state, or from outside the state. The
table below also highlights the different official languages in different states, alongside the
second languages.

Share of Total (Urban and Rural)
Migrants from within India
Official State
Language
Second
Duration of
Language
Residence

From within
the State

From outside
the State

1 - 4 years
10 yrs. and more

35%
43.70%

65%
56.30%

Bengali

1 - 4 years

63.40%

36.60%

Hindi

10 yrs. and more

52.70%

47.30%

Tamil Nadu

Tamil
Telugu

1 - 4 years
10 yrs. and more

76.90%
78.80%

23.10%
21.20%

Bengaluru
(Bangalore)

Karnataka

Kannada
Tamil

1 - 4 years
10 yrs. and more

51.50%
56.10%

48.50%
43.90%

Hyderabad

Andhra Pradesh

Telugu
Urdu

1 - 4 years
10 yrs. and more

81.50%
81.50%

18.50%
18.50%

Ahmedabad

Gujarat

Gujarati
Hindi

1 - 4 years
10 yrs. and more

68.50%
69.20%

31.50%
30.80%

Pune

Maharashtra

Marathi
Hindi

1 - 4 years
10 yrs. and more

63.60%
75.40%

36.40%
24.60%

Surat

Gujarat

Gujarati
Hindi

1 - 4 years
10 yrs. and more

49.40%
54.50%

50.60%
45.50%

Jaipur

Rajasthan

Hindi
Urdu

1 - 4 years
10 yrs. and more

63.00%
69.80%

37%
30.20%

City

State

Mumbai
(Bombay)

Maharashtra

Marathi
Hindi

Kolkata
(Calcutta)

West Bengal

Chennai
(Madras)

Source: Census of India 2001, Table D-3
Notes: Delhi is not included in the list because it is “city state”, and all immigrants into
Delhi are by definition from outside Delhi and the distinction as made in the last two
columns, cannot be made for Delhi. The more recent, 2011 census could not be used as this
specific data has not yet been made publicly available.
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Table 4.6: Temporary Migration to Urban Area
This table shows the influence of a variety of factors on an individual’s choice to
temporarily migrate to an urban area in India.

english

Highest level of education

(1)
Duration
less than 1yr.
-0.046
(0.150)

(2)
(3)
Duration
Duration
more than 1 yr. more than 2 yrs.
0.251
0.130
(0.340)
(0.438)

0.070***
(0.012)

0.088***
(0.029)

0.056
(0.038)

Log of income

-0.093*
(0.052)

-0.178
(0.125)

0.070
(0.173)

Rural residence

-0.624***
(0.173)

-0.657
(0.402)

-0.375
(0.472)

Hindi not official state language

-0.244**
(0.098)

-0.378
(0.232)

0.089
(0.306)

Age

-0.015***
(0.005)

0.001
(0.012)

-0.013
(0.016)

constant

2.519***
(0.614)

2.842*
(1.553)

0.458
(2.147)

2101

403

226

Obs.

Note: observations include males older than 24 years of age from both, rural and urban areas.

Standard errors are in parenthesis
Asterisks denote significance levels (* = 0.1, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01)
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APPENDIX A
PROOF FOR THEOREMS IN CHAPTER 2
Proof of Theorem 1. First, since conditions (1) – (6) hold, functions 𝐹1 and 𝐹2 in (8) and
(9) are strictly increasing, right-continuous, and indeed cumulative distribution functions13.
Second, it is straightforward to check that if Player 1 randomizes according to the
cumulative distribution function 𝐹1 (𝑥) on the interval [0, 𝑡2 ], then Player 2’s expected
payoff for bidding 𝑥 ∈ [0, 𝑡2 ] is
𝑉𝐹1 (𝑥) − 𝐶2 (𝑥) = 𝑉

1
𝐶 (𝑥) − 𝐶2 (𝑥) = 0.
𝑉 2

Analogously, if Player 2 randomizes according to the cumulative distribution function
𝐹2 (𝑥) on the interval [0, 𝑡2 ], then Player 1’s expected payoff for bidding 𝑥 ∈ [0, 𝑡2 ] is

𝑉𝐹2 (𝑥) − 𝐶1 (𝑥) = 𝑉 (

𝑉 − 𝐶1 (𝑡2 ) 1
+ 𝐶1 (𝑥)) − 𝐶1 (𝑥) = 𝑉 − 𝐶1 (𝑡2 ) > 0.
𝑉
𝑉

Therefore, a mixed-strategy NE is obtained. ∎
Proof of Theorem 3. if 𝑡2 < 𝑠, then from (10) and (11) we get
𝑡2

𝑡2

𝑆𝑇𝐶 = ∫ 𝐶1 (𝑥) 𝑑𝐹1 (𝑥) + ∫ 𝐶2 (𝑥) 𝑑𝐹2 (𝑥)
0

𝑆𝑇𝐶 =

0

1
𝐶 (𝑡 )𝐶 (𝑡 ) = 𝐶1 (𝑡2 ).
𝑉 1 2 2 2

13

For the definition of a cumulative distribution function, see, for example, Olofsson and Andersson
(2012).
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Suppose that 𝑡2 ≥ 𝑠. Then,
1 𝑠
1 𝑡2
𝑆𝑇𝐶 = ∫ 𝐿1 (𝑥) 𝑑𝐿2 (𝑥) + ∫ (𝐿1 (𝑥) +𝑚) 𝑑(𝐿2 (𝑥) + 𝑚) +
𝑉 0
𝑉 𝑠
1 𝑠
1 𝑡2
∫ 𝐿2 (𝑥) 𝑑𝐿1 (𝑥) + ∫ (𝐿2 (𝑥) +𝑚) 𝑑(𝐿1 (𝑥) + 𝑚) ,
𝑉 0
𝑉 𝑠
1
1 𝑡2
= 𝐿2 (𝑠)𝐿1 (𝑠) + ∫ (𝐿1 (𝑥) +𝑚) 𝑑(𝐿2 (𝑥) + 𝑚) +
𝑉
𝑉 𝑠
1
((𝐿2 (𝑡2 ) + 𝑚)(𝐿1 (𝑡2 ) + 𝑚) − (𝐿2 (𝑠) + 𝑚)(𝐿1 (𝑠) + 𝑚))
𝑉
1 𝑡2
− ∫ (𝐿1 (𝑥) +𝑚) 𝑑(𝐿2 (𝑥) + 𝑚),
𝑉 𝑠
𝑆𝑇𝐶 = 𝐶1 (𝑡2 ) −

𝑚
(𝐿 (𝑠) + 𝐿2 (𝑠) + 𝑚).
𝑉 1

Analogously, for aggregate bids with soft caps,
𝑡2

𝑡2

𝑆𝐴𝐵 = ∫ 𝑥 𝑑𝐹1 (𝑥) + ∫ 𝑥 𝑑𝐹2 (𝑥)
0

𝑆𝐴𝐵 =

=

0

𝑠
𝑡2
𝑠
𝑡2
1
(∫ 𝑥 𝑑𝐿2 (𝑥) + ∫ 𝑥 𝑑𝐿2 (𝑥) + ∫ 𝑥 𝑑𝐿1 (𝑥) + ∫ 𝑥 𝑑𝐿1 (𝑥)) ,
𝑉 0
𝑠
0
𝑠

𝑠
𝑡2
1
((𝑥(𝐿2 (𝑥) + 𝐿1 (𝑥)))| + (𝑥(𝐿2 (𝑥) + 𝐿1 (𝑥)))|
𝑉
0
𝑠
𝑠

𝑡2

𝑠

𝑡2

− (∫ 𝐿1 (𝑥) 𝑑𝑥 + ∫ 𝐿1 (𝑥) 𝑑𝑥 + ∫ 𝐿2 (𝑥) 𝑑𝑥 + ∫ 𝐿2 (𝑥) 𝑑𝑥)) ,
0

𝑆𝐴𝐵 =

𝑠

0

0

𝑡2
𝑡2
1
(𝑡2 (𝐿1 (𝑡2 ) + 𝐿2 (𝑡2 )) − (∫ 𝐿1 (𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ 𝐿2 (𝑥)𝑑𝑥)).
𝑉
0
0

∎
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APPENDIX B
PROOF FOR THEOREMS IN CHAPTER 3
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose that conditions (1) – (5) and (9) hold and each player bids
the rigid cap 𝑟. Then, player 𝑖 gets the following payoff

𝑢𝑖 (𝑟, 𝑟) =

𝑉
− 𝐶𝑖 (𝑟) ≥ 0
2

and cannot increase her payoff given the bid of her opponent. ∎
Proof of Theorem 2. First, since conditions (1) – (5), and (10) hold, functions 𝐻1 and 𝐻2
in (12) and (13) respectively, are strictly increasing and indeed cumulative distribution
functions.
Second, it is straightforward to check that if Player 1 randomizes according to the
cumulative distribution function 𝐹1 (𝑥) on the interval [0, 𝑡], then Player 2’s expected
payoff for bidding 𝑥 ∈ [0, 𝑡] is

𝑉𝐻1 (𝑥) − 𝐿2 (𝑥) = 𝑉

1
𝐿 (𝑥) − 𝐿2 (𝑥) = 0.
𝑉 2

Suppose that Player 2 bids 𝑥 = 𝑟. Then, her expected payoff is
1
𝑉𝐻1 (𝑡) + (1 − 𝐻1 (𝑡))𝑉 − 𝐿2 (𝑟) = 0,
2
where the first term is the expected benefit, if Player 1 bids in the interval [0, 𝑡], the second
term is the expected benefit, if Player 1 bids exactly the rigid cap, 𝑟, and the last term is
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the cost of bidding. The expected payoff has to be the same as the expected payoff after
Player 2 bids on the interval [0, 𝑡].
We get

𝐻1 (𝑡) =

2
𝐿 (𝑟) − 1.
𝑉 2

Since

𝐻1 (𝑡) =

1
𝐿 (𝑡),
𝑉 2

We obtain
𝐿2 (𝑡) = 2𝐿2 (𝑟) − 𝑉,
or
𝑡 = 𝐿−1
2 (2𝐿2 (𝑟) − 𝑉).
Analogously, if Player 2 randomizes according to the cumulative distribution function
𝐻2 (𝑥) on the interval [0, 𝑡], then Player 1’s expected payoff for bidding 𝑥 ∈ [0, 𝑡] is
𝑉𝐻2 (𝑥) − 𝐿1 (𝑥) = 𝑉𝐻2 (𝑡) − 𝐿1 (𝑡).
Suppose that player 1 bids 𝑥 = 𝑟. Then, her expected payoff is
1
𝑉𝐻2 (𝑡) + (1 − 𝐻2 (𝑡))𝑉 − 𝐿1 (𝑟) = 𝑉𝐻2 (𝑡) − 𝐿1 (𝑡),
2
since she has to be indifferent among her bids.
Therefore,

64

1
(1 − 𝐻2 (𝑡))𝑉 = 𝐿1 (𝑟) − 𝐿1 (𝑡)
2

(i)

1
(1 + 𝐻2 (𝑡))𝑉 − 𝑉𝐻2 (𝑥) = 𝐿1 (𝑟) − 𝐿1 (𝑥).
2

(ii)

and

summing (i) and (ii), we get
𝑉 − 𝑉𝐻2 (𝑥) = 2𝐿1 (𝑟) − 𝐿1 (𝑥) − 𝐿1 (𝑡),
or

𝐻2 (𝑥) = 1 −

1
(2𝐿1 (𝑟) − 𝐿1 (𝑥) − 𝐿1 (𝑡)).
𝑉

Therefore, a mixed-strategy NE is obtained. ∎
Proof of Theorem 3.
𝑟

𝑟

𝑅𝑇𝐶(𝑟) = ∫ 𝐿1 (𝑥) 𝑑𝐻1 (𝑥) + ∫ 𝐿2 (𝑥) 𝑑𝐻2 (𝑥)
0

0

𝑡

𝑡

= ∫ 𝐿1 (𝑥) 𝑑𝐻1 (𝑥) + 𝐿1 (𝑟)𝐻1 (𝑟) + ∫ 𝐿2 (𝑥) 𝑑𝐻2 (𝑥) + 𝐿2 (𝑟)𝐻2 (𝑟)
0

0

or
1 𝑡
= ∫ 𝐿1 (𝑥) 𝑑𝐻2 (𝑥) + 𝐿1 (𝑟)(1 − 𝐻1 (𝑡)) +
𝑉 0
𝑡

∫ 𝐿2 (𝑥) 𝑑 (
0

𝑉 − (2𝐿1 (𝑟) − 𝐿1 (𝑡)) 1
+ 𝐿1 (𝑥)) + 𝐿2 (𝑟)(1 − 𝐻2 (𝑡)),
𝑉
𝑉
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1 𝑡
1 𝑡
(𝑥)
(𝑥)
(𝑟)(1
(𝑡))
= ∫ 𝐿1
𝑑𝐿2
+ 𝐿1
− 𝐻1
+ ∫ 𝐿2 (𝑥) 𝑑𝐿1 (𝑥) + 𝐿2 (𝑟)(1 − 𝐻2 (𝑡)),
𝑉 0
𝑉 0
=

=

1
𝐿 (𝑡)𝐿2 (𝑡) + 𝐿1 (𝑟)(1 − 𝐿1 (𝑡)) + 𝐿2 (𝑟)(1 − 𝐻2 (𝑡)),
𝑉 1

1
1
𝐿1 (𝑡)𝐿2 (𝑡) + 𝐿1 (𝑟) (1 − 𝐿2 (𝑡))
𝑉
𝑉
𝑉 − (2𝐿1 (𝑟) − 𝐿1 (𝑡)) 1
+ 𝐿2 (𝑟) (1 − (
+ 𝐿1 (𝑡))) ,
𝑉
𝑉

=

𝑉 − 2(𝐿1 (𝑟) − 𝐿1 (𝑡))
1
1
𝐿1 (𝑡)𝐿2 (𝑡) + 𝐿1 (𝑟) (1 − 𝐿2 (𝑡)) + 𝐿2 (𝑟) (1 − (
)) ,
𝑉
𝑉
𝑉

=

2(𝐿1 (𝑟) − 𝐿1 (𝑡))
1
1
𝐿1 (𝑡)𝐿2 (𝑡) + 𝐿1 (𝑟) (1 − 𝐿2 (𝑡)) + 𝐿2 (𝑟) (
),
𝑉
𝑉
𝑉

= 𝐿1 (𝑟) +

1
(𝐿 (𝑡)𝐿2 (𝑡) − 𝐿1 (𝑟)𝐿2 (𝑡) + 2𝐿2 (𝑟)(𝐿1 (𝑟) − 𝐿1 (𝑡))) ,
𝑉 1

since
𝑡 = 𝐿−1
2 (2𝐿2 (𝑟) − 𝑉),
we get
𝑅𝑇𝐶(𝑟) = 𝐿1 (𝑟)
+

1
(𝐿 (𝑡)(2𝐿2 (𝑟) − 𝑉) − 𝐿1 (𝑟)(2𝐿2 (𝑟) − 𝑉)
𝑉 1

+ 2𝐿2 (𝑟)(𝐿1 (𝑟) − 𝐿1 (𝑡))) ,
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= 𝐿1 (𝑟) +

1
(2𝐿1 (𝑡)𝐿2 (𝑟) − 𝑉𝐿1 (𝑡) − 2𝐿1 (𝑟)𝐿2 (𝑟) + 𝑉𝐿1 (𝑟) + 2𝐿1 (𝑟)𝐿2 (𝑟)
𝑉
− 2𝐿1 (𝑡)𝐿2 (𝑟)),
𝑅𝑇𝐶(𝑟) = 2𝐿1 (𝑟) − 𝐿1 (𝑡).

Analogously,
𝑟

𝑟

𝑅𝐴𝐵(𝑟) = ∫ 𝑥 𝑑𝐻1 (𝑥) + ∫ 𝑥 𝑑𝐻2 (𝑥)
0

0

𝑡

𝑡

= ∫ 𝑥 𝑑𝐻1 (𝑥) + 𝑟𝐻1 (𝑟) + ∫ 𝑥 𝑑𝐻2 (𝑥) + 𝑟𝐻1 (𝑟)
0

=

0

1 𝑡
1 𝑡
∫ 𝑥 𝑑𝐿2 (𝑥) + 𝑟(1 − 𝐻1 (𝑡)) + ∫ 𝑥 𝑑𝐿1 (𝑥) + 𝑟(1 − 𝐻2 (𝑡))
𝑉 0
𝑉 0

𝑡
1
𝑅𝐴𝐵(𝑟) = (𝑡(𝐿1 (𝑡) + 𝐿2 (𝑡)) − ∫ (𝐿1 (𝑡) + 𝐿2 (𝑡))𝑑𝑥) + 𝑟(2 − 𝐻1 (𝑡) − 𝐻2 (𝑡)).
𝑉
0

∎
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